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Zbigniew Kantyka
The Polish experiment 1980—1989 —  
revolution or transformation?
Antinomies of transition  
from authoritarianism to democracy
Each revolution had been cursed and blessed, 
but the results seemed equally remote from the darkest 
forebodings of its victims and the brightest hopes of its leaders.1
Abstract: The article is an attempt to assess some of the key aspects of the Polish break‑
through of 1980–1989 in the context of the many years of discussion about the nature and 
consequences of the events that took place during that period. The main considerations include 
resolving the still valid dilemma of whether it is justified to define this breakthrough as a revo‑
lution. The text contains a presentation and evaluation of the main arguments made for and 
against such a conclusion. In methodological terms, the discourse involves confronting the 
characteristic features relating to the genesis, goals, process and results of the Polish experi‑
ment of 1980—1989, with the theoretical knowledge on the phenomenon of the revolution 
based on historical analyses and contemporary experience. 
In science, the term “experiment” is usually used to describe cognitive processes involving 
an intentional interference of the researcher in the real world in order to acquire cognitive data. 
It happens, however, that certain unique phenomena and processes characterised by an objec‑
tive course of events, which scientists can analyse in similar terms to a conventional induced 
experiment, enter the scope of this concept. In certain circumstances, a systematic observation 
of events which have not been induced by the researcher, but are exceptional and important in 
themselves, can provide the key to discovering the sense, regularities, and mechanisms of the 
real world. This is significant for social and political studies in particular, in which the space 
for utilising the classical, natural sciences -based experiment, is very limited. 
The Polish political events of 1980—1989 made way for further disintegration of the 
colonial -imperial division of the world by initiating the fall of the Eastern Bloc. It turned out 
1 I. Berl i n: The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their History. New York 1996, 
p. 29.
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to be not just an episode, but an effective initiation of a powerful and extensive process that 
led to a total change in the global geopolitical system. The fact that it happened in the centre 
of Europe, rather than in its peripheries, exacerbated the surprise of such a course of events, 
and of its final result in particular.
Key words: democratic transformation, revolution, post -totalitarian authoritarianism, Solidar‑
ity movement, Self -Governing Republic
The success of the democratic paradigm of social life is, next to the dis‑
integration of colonialism, undoubtedly one of the most important facts in 
the political history of the 20th century. Regardless of the specific assess‑
ments and analysis, it is beyond discussion that the Polish political events 
of 1980—1989 activated the next stage in the disintegration of the imperial 
and colonial world — namely disintegration of the so -called real -socialism 
block of countries. It turned out not to be only an instance, but an effective 
initiation of a powerful and extensive process that led to the complete change 
in the global geopolitical system. The fact that this occurred in the centre of 
Europe, and not in its peripheries, surmounted that surprise of the events the 
unfolded, their course and, in particular, of the final result.
The term “experiment” is usually used in science to describe cognitive 
processes involving an intentional interference of the researcher in the real 
world for purpose of acquiring cognitive data. It happens, however, that cer‑
tain unique phenomena and objective processes enter the scope of this con‑
cept, which scientists can analyse in a similar way to the conventional induced 
experiment. This applies both to phenomena found in the social sphere and in 
the natural world, which are independent of the researcher. When using this 
term to refer to a special moment in the political history of Poland, Europe 
and the world, I apply it in full knowledge of the consequences resulting 
from its application in such a broad sense, remaining convinced, that only in 
exceptional circumstances may there exist such a thing as a “natural experi‑
ment” – a concept which seemingly is internally contradictory, because it 
distorts the sharp distinction between the terms observation and experiment 
in their traditional sense.2 In certain circumstances, the systematic observa‑
tion of exceptional and important events which have not been induced by the 
investigator can provide the key to discovering the point and regularity of the 
mechanisms of the real world. This is particularly important in social, and 
especially political, studies, in which the sphere for applying the classical, 
2 Cf. A. Su łek: Eksperyment w badaniach społecznych. Warszawa 1979, pp. 16—18. 
With regard to the political events of 1980—1981 in Poland, the term “experiment” is used 
for instance by Andrzej Fiszke in the newest historical monograph on this period. See 
A. Fr isz ke: Rewolucja Solidarności 1980—1981. Kraków 2014, pp. 973—974.
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natural sciences -based, experiment, is very limited. The main problem is, of 
course, striving to search for knowledge about transformations in the macro-
social scale, determined by a complex combination of ideological, economic 
and cultural considerations.
There is a plethora of detailed descriptions of historical events of the 
1980—1989 period based on many available documents and accounts, as well 
as the increasingly numerous, often different, attempts at their interpretation. 
From the point of view of political sciences, what is most important is the 
sense of what happened. Although it is likely that we still do not know all 
the facts, and information not available today will surely contribute to a new 
understanding in the future, it seems, however, that these will not be sources 
which will fundamentally change the theoretical analysis capabilities we have 
today.
The article is an attempt to assess some of the key aspects of the Polish 
breakthrough of 1980—1989 in the context of the many years of discussion 
about the nature and consequences of the events that took place during that 
period. It is not intended as a detailed analysis of the course of events and 
facts, as these have already been covered in numerous domestic and foreign 
historical, sociological and political research studies.3 The main considera‑
3 The complete bibliography of research texts on this issue is very extensive. Worth men‑
tioning are the following references, as they go beyond a descriptive and historical narrative, 
and are a source of theoretical inspiration: After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative 
Lessons of Transition. Eds. M. McFau l, K. Stoner -Weiss. Cambridge 2004; T.G. Ash: 
The Magic Lantern. The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and 
Prague. Cambridge 1993; Idem: The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980—1982. London 
1983; N.  Bandelj: From Communists to Foreign Capitalists: The Social Foundations of 
Foreign of Foreign Direct Investments in Postsocialist Europe. Princeton 2008; S.  Bi rch: 
Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post ‑Communist Europe. Basingstoke—
New York 2003; V. Bu nce: “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Post‑
communist Experience.” World Politics 2003, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 167—192; Central and 
East European Politics. From Communism to Democracy. Eds. S.L. Wolch i k, J.L. Cu r r y. 
Lanham 2011; A.M. Ci r t aut as: The Polish Solidarity Movement: Revolution, Democracy 
and Natural Rights. London 1997; T.D. Cla rk: Beyond Post ‑communist Studies: Political Sci‑
ence and the New Democracies of Europe. New York 2002; The Consolidation of Democracy 
in East ‑Central Europe. Eds. K. Dawisha, B. Pa r rot t. Cambridge 1997; Democratization 
in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives. Eds. G. P r id ham, T. Van ‑
hanen. London 1994; R.H. Dix: “Eastern Europe’s Implications for Revolutionary Theory.” 
Polity 1991, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 227—242; Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution 
1945—1991. Documents and Analyses. Ed. L.H. Leg te r s. Lexington 1992; A.G. Fran k: 
“Revolution in Eastern Europe: Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (and Socialists?).” 
Third World Quarterly 1990, Vol. 12, Issue 2, pp. 36—52; Freedom and Choice in a Democ‑
racy: The Difficult Passage to Freedom. Eds. R. Magl iola, R. K hu r u. Washington 2004; 
J.K. Glen n: “Contentious Politics and Democratization: Comparing the Impact of Social 
Movements of the Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe.” Political Studies 2003, No. 51, 
pp. 103—120; M.F. Gold man: Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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tions involve resolving the still valid dilemma of whether it is justified to 
define this breakthrough as a revolution. The text contains a presentation 
and evaluation of the main arguments made for and against such a conclu‑
sion. In methodological terms, the discourse involves confronting the char‑
acteristic features relating to the genesis, goals, process and results of the 
Polish experiment of 1980—1989, with the theoretical knowledge on the 
phenomenon of the revolution derived from historical analyses and contem‑
porary experience. 
The genesis
August 1980 brought about the ultimate collapse of the myth of the 
classlessness of Polish society, which constituted one of the cornerstones of 
the ideology of “real socialism.” The social order, which had been formed 
since 1945, according to the rules contained in resolutions of the party, in 
the propaganda and the official interpretation of Marxism -Leninism, was 
meant to destroy antagonistic social divisions. Achievement of this state was 
announced officially in Poland in the 1970s by announcing the “the moral-
political unity of the nation.” This image of social structure lacked revolu‑
tionary potential — the role of the state led by a dominant party came down 
only to administration involving the technical resolving of marginal conflict, 
which did not have any ideological -political background. In reality, in this 
seemingly classless society deep divisions were still in place,4 the masking 
Political, Economic, and Social Challenges. Armonk 1997; S. Hu nt i ng ton: The Third 
Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. Norman—London 1991; K. Ku mar: “The 
Revolutions of 1989 in East -Central Europe and the Idea of Revolution.” In: Culture, Moder‑
nity and Revolution. Essays in Honor of Zygmunt Bauman. Eds. R. K i l mi ns te r,  I .  Va rcoe. 
New York 1996, pp. 127—153; J.J. Li n z, A. Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post ‑Communist Europe. Balti‑
more 1996; A. P rzeworsk i: Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York 1991; Postcommunism and the Theory of 
Democracy. Eds. R.D. A nder son Jr., M.S. Fish, S.E. Hanson, P.G. Roeder. Princeton 
2001; Ch. Ti l ly: European Revolutions 1492—1992. Oxford 1995; Transitions to Capital‑
ism and Democracy in Russia and Central Europe: Achievements, Problems, Prospects. 
Ed. M.D. Hancock,  J.  Log ue. Westport 2000; Transition to Democracy in Poland. Eds. 
R.F. St a a r. Basigstoke 1998 (2nd edn); J.H.H. Wei le r: “The Transformation of Europe.” 
The Yale Law Journal 1991, Vol. 100, No. 8, pp. 2403—2483; H.A. Welsh: “Political Tran‑
sition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe.” Comparative Politics 1994, Vol. 26, No. 4, 
pp. 379—394; S. W hite: Communism and Its Collapse. New York 2001.
4 See S. Magala: Walka klas w bezklasowej Polsce. Gdańsk 2012.
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of which through intensive indoctrination and suppression by means of the 
regime’s repression mechanism could not be sustained.
From the point of view of the chances of making a real change, not with‑
out significance was the fact that as a result of the evolution forced by the 
political events of 1956 and 1970, the existing system significantly distanced 
itself from the model of pure totalitarianism, whose main characteristic is 
absolute conformism achieved by means of terror, as well as constant and 
ever -present organised moral -political pressure.5 The term “totalitarianism” 
is too strong a word to describe the Polish post -war political system. It can 
only be used to refer to the few years of radical Stalinism.6 Although the 
leaders of the ruling party intended to achieve complete governance cover‑
ing all spheres of existence of the individual and the collective, they failed 
to achieve this state.7 Post ‑totalitarian authoritarianism8 with an incomplete‑
ly nationalised economy and private individual agriculture, an autonomous 
Church, a controlled democratic opposition and a delusive “socialist” ideol‑
ogy, created potentially new possibilities for the contestation of the existing 
reality. Nevertheless, the fact that the Polish workers’ protest of August 1980 
opened the chances for a real, far -reaching qualitative transformation of the 
political system, heralding and implying changes in the political history of 
the world, came as an absolute surprise to everybody. Neither the rulers, who 
not only prior to August 1980, but virtually right up to 4 June 1989, nor the 
leaders and activists of illegal opposition structures, were aware of the scale 
of the approaching change. Polish sociology and political sciences turned 
out to be helpless.9 The intensive analytical and prognostic work performed 
over the years by western Sovietology centres also proved worth little. Unex‑
pectedly, a local workers’ strike at one of the Polish shipyards sparked an 
avalanche of macro -social effects which altered the political history of the 
world.
5 A. Wal ick i: “Totalitaryzm i posttotalitaryzm. Próba definicji.” In: Idem: Polskie 
zmagania z wolnością. Widziane z boku. Kraków 2000, pp. 104—105.
6 A. Tou ra i ne: Solidarność. Analiza ruchu społecznego 1980—1981. Gdańsk 2010, 
pp. 49—53.
7 K. Ker s ten: “O użyteczności konceptu totalitaryzmu w badaniach historii PRL.” 
In: Eadem: Pisma rozproszone. Eds. T. Sza rot a, D. Libion ka. Toruń 2005, p. 372.
8 L. Ma żewsk i: Posttotalitarny autorytaryzm PRL 1956—1989. Analiza ustrojowopoli‑
tyczna. Warszawa—Biała Podlaska 2010, p. 9: “This was, like any authoritarianism, a system 
of limited power, as opposed to totalitarianism, which signifies a system of unlimited power, 
wishing to subdue not only the area of traditional politics, but also the social domain as 
a whole.” 
9 See A. Su łek: “O nieprzewidywalności rewolucji. Dlaczego polska socjologia nie 
przewidziała „Solidarności”.” In: Idem: Obrazy z życia socjologii w Polsce. Warszawa 2011, 
pp. 243—265.
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Values and aims
Earlier manifestations of disobedience, revolt, protests within the politi‑
cal system of “real socialism,” were limited in their extent. As in many other 
cases known from history, they were not revolutionary in nature, because 
“the aim of such rebellions was not a challenge of authority or the established 
order of things as such; it was always a matter of exchanging the person who 
happened to be in authority.”10
The declared objectives of Solidarity’s programme were very much 
aligned to this model, and went beyond it only slightly. As aptly noted by 
Jerzy Holzer, “it is doubtful that destruction of communist rule was either 
the primary or even secondary objective of Solidarity. The aim was to restrict 
its scope of activity, to change the system.”11 Marginalisation of the radical 
voices within the movement, since such of course existed, stemmed from 
past experience and awareness of the existing conditions. It was the result of 
realism and pragmatism, which led to deliberate “self -limitation” of the scale 
of the voiced demands. In fact, however, the current practical activities and 
the proposals for reform being developed, as a result of their consequences, 
led to a fundamental change in the political system — hence they had a revo‑
lutionary dimension. The crisis of 1980, unlike the earlier disturbances in the 
functioning of “real socialism” in Poland, for the first time “became a turn‑
ing point, and not, as before, a situation of a special regulation, reducing ten‑
sion only for a period of time.”12 
It is this very feature — the qualitative, radical, profound change in the 
political system, which received the most prominent position in most of the 
modern definitions of revolution, which takes into account the experiences 
of the so ‑called third wave of democratisation.13 According to Andrew Hey‑
wood, “revolutions differ from rebellions and revolts in that they bring about 
fundamental change, a change in the political system itself, as opposed to 
merely the displacement of a governing elite or a change of policy.”14
The dilemma — freedom or equality? — appeared already in ancient 
times, when the idea of isonomy fell — a system based on full political 
equality of all members of the community, ruling out the existence of 
a higher power and a permanent separation between the rulers and the ruled. 
10 H. A rendt: On Revolution. London 1973, p. 40.
11 See J. Holze r: “„Solidarność” — rewolucja, powstanie czy reforma. Dyskus‑
ja panelowa.” In: Solidarność od wewnątrz 1980—1981. Eds. A. Fr isz ke,  K .  Pe r sak, 
P.  Sowi ńsk i. Warszawa 2013, p. 346.
12 Cf. J. St an isz k is: Postkomunizm. Próba opisu. Gdańsk 2001, p. 21.
13 See S.P. Hu nt i ng ton: The Third Wave…
14 A. Hey wood: Key Concepts in Politics. Basingstoke—London 2000, p. 182.
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This solution permanently connected both values — freedom could only be 
realized among equals, equality was the necessary condition for the exist‑
ence of freedom, it was its essence.15 A part of this idea was incorporated 
into the model of ancient communal democracy based on the idea of (pos‑
itive) political freedom. Modernity and liberalism questioned this way of 
thinking about how social life is organised and opted for individualism and 
civic (negative) freedom which became the basis of political governance in 
a capitalist country.
“Real socialism” was a solution which was based on a delusive declara‑
tive “socialist democracy,” in which the real limits of freedom were defined 
by the ruling elite. Challenging this order could therefore lead to two, sig‑
nificantly different, developments — rejection of the principle of community 
in favour of liberal individualism, or an attempt to fill the socialist idea of 
empowerment of the people with real substance. 
The choice was clear — “the revolution of Solidarity was to ‘citizenise’ 
freedom, to make it public. It was a revolution in the concept of freedom 
itself, which guided social relations, culminating in a largely successful 
attempt to restore the freedom in all its dimensions. Its essence was the citi‑
zens’ garnering of the courage to reveal themselves publically, and as a con‑
sequence, make them politically committed.”16 It was, therefore, about the 
joining together of the majority in order to settle public issues, about par‑
ticipatory democracy, in which the role of the citizen would not only involve 
casting votes into the ballot box.
Alain Touraine, while summarizing the first phase of the Polish revolution 
which culminated in martial law, clearly stressed that “workers do not dream 
of returning to capitalism, looking for responsibility for the whole nation, 
also because the communist Poland awarded the workers a central place in 
society.”17 It was not therefore about abandoning the model, but rather to fill 
in the declarative ideological slogan with real substance. Solidarity’s demand 
for an authentic empowerment of the working class, paradoxically, was axi‑
ologically justified in the ideals of socialism and of communism, which were 
clearly voiced, but in practice remained unfulfilled by the ruling elite.
“The idea of self -government was based on the participation of all employ‑
ees in the decisions and accountability and in reconciling divergent interests. 
Was it feasible? It was certainly not implemented after 1989. Nevertheless, 
this idea granted Solidarity dynamism, mass support, the perspective, which 
it sought to achieve, and thus gave it the power needed to pursue it.”18 The 
country which was constructed in the post -revolutionary period with its legal 
15 H. A rendt: Kondycja ludzka. Warszawa 2000, p. 38.
16 E. Ci żewska: Filozofia publiczna Solidarności. Warszawa 2010, p. 118.
17 A. Tou ra i ne: Solidarność. Analiza…, p. 48.
18 A. Fr i sz ke: Rewolucja Solidarności…, p. 975. 
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and institutional standards, and, in particular, their practical implementation, 
not only failed to pursue its original aspirations, but denied them altogether. 
In place of a system based on pseudo -democratic Leninist authoritarian‑
ism, a new order was created, in which freedom, despite legal guarantees, 
remained of symbolic value. In -depth debates on public affairs, about the 
goals and methods of action for achieving common good, had altogether dis‑
appeared. Social life was atomised, becoming a collective sum of the fate of 
groups and individuals who have been separated from one another. 
In the economic sphere, the most painful disappointment as to the effects 
of the revolution, is associated with deep, progressive social stratification — 
a drastic diversification of standards of living and availability of consumer 
goods. This is particularly striking in light of the statistical economic growth, 
which after 1989 became an undisputed fact. An element of the idea of soli‑
darity, on which the political programme of change built in 1980—1981 was 
based, was a concept of a fair share in the income created by the community, 
far from the primitive urawniłowka (artificial egalitarianism), which, how‑
ever, was based on the concept of social egalitarianism. 
The “Programme for the construction of a Self -Governing Republic of 
Poland” presented and adopted at the first Congress of Solidarity established 
that the basic unit of the economy would be the social enterprise, managed by 
the workers through the workers’ council, which would be operatively man‑
aged by a director elected in a contest by the council. The council would also 
be responsible for dismissing him. It was entrusted with national property to 
be managed in the interest of society and its own workforce.19
Meanwhile, the economic result of the system change was stratification 
instead of equality. The privatized economy resulted in a replacement of the 
former differences arising out of the voluntary sharing of goods according 
to the criterion of political discretion, with much more radical dispropor‑
tions resulting from the ruthlessness of the free market economy. A system 
which was a contradiction of the ideals and expectations, which lay at the 
root of the workers’ uprising, was created. The views of the neoliberal-
leaning, change -inclined economists, which stood at the margins of the 
political discussion, gradually gained in importance, eventually to become 
the basis for the economic reconstruction plan to be put into action. A feed‑
back loop appeared between free -market economic theories and political 
practice. The different versions of managing companies, which had grown 
out of socialist ideology, aimed at creating a real system of workers’ self- 
governance. The marketization manoeuvre did not prove to be a neces‑
19 See ibidem, p. 684. See also: P. Za łęsk i: “Czy Solidarność była społeczeństwem oby‑
watelskim? Jak został zapomniany neorepublikański projekt samorządnej Rzeczypospolitej.” 
Kultura i Społeczeństwo 2010, No. 4, pp. 141—152.
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sary, painful episode, but a long -term strategy. Successive coalition gov‑
ernments, regardless of their ideological orientation, were headed in the 
same direction, that is focussing on the market and not the social aspect of 
the “social market economy” formula. This scenario greatly contradicted 
the interests and expectations of the masses of workers. It was, however, 
consistent, and this most probably was not a coincidence, with the needs of 
the old and new political elites seeking to strengthen their position in the 
economic sphere.
Of course, dissatisfaction with the system change effects not only con‑
cerned the economic dimension, though this is where resentment and longing 
for socialist 1970s Poland was primarily focussed. More important seems to 
be the wider dimension — the general feeling of injustice arising from the 
new privileges gained by the rulers. It is this immanent feature of the system 
of “real socialism” which the Solidarity revolution was directed against. 
Improvement of the economic position and the standard of living during 
the governance of Edward Gierek, despite temporary crises and drawbacks, 
could not obscure the growing lack of ideology of the elites and the increas‑
ing gap between the slogans and the particular interests of the party and state 
nomenklatura. The economy of scarcity was for Polish society, which was 
hardened by various historical experiences, an acceptable reality, and this 
state of affairs could have been rationally explained, had it touched upon 
everybody equally. That, however, was not the case. Initially only in the non-
formal realm, which with time was also regulated by legal acts, society was 
divided into groups which were more equal than others. Sławomir Magala 
pointed for instance to the legal regulation of 1972, published in the Official 
Journal — a Decree on the salaries of persons occupying state administra‑
tion and political positions and the members of their families, which had 
sanctioned the so far informal boundary between the political elite and the 
rest of society.20
An important cause of the strikes of August 1980 was the dissatisfaction 
of society about the economic situation — the first version of their demands 
mainly addressed social and welfare issues. The strike, however, had another 
cause: defending the dignity of the ordinary worker against the unjustified 
repression of the management of companies. The first demand was the with‑
drawal of the decision to dismiss Anna Walentynowicz from work on disci‑
plinary grounds five months before reaching her retirement age, Ms. Walen‑
tynowicz was known for her activity in trade unions. This was the first act 
of solidarity. Another decisive factor which determined the further course of 
events was the spectacular resignation of shipbuilders from their privileged 
position, which other companies were not granted. They continued the strike, 
20 S. Magala: Walka klas w bezklasowej Polsce…, pp. 61—62.
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even though their own demands were going to be met. As of that moment, 
thanks to the resignation from egoistic group elitism, a battle had begun 
for something more — for political objectives. Spiritual values were given 
importance over materiality: the foundation was “awareness of the capacity 
to act, not for the benefit of tangible goods, but for developing oneself as an 
active entity, finding in oneself an embodiment of collective activity.”21 This 
meant combining the fight for the implementation of specific individual and 
group goals and values with the fight for the reconstruction of the general 
principles of social life.
Lack of political equality in a system of liberal empirical democracy is an 
evident phenomenon and trend not only from the perspective of the aggres‑
sive leftist critique of capitalism. Even Robert Dahl, a leading theoretician of 
American political pluralism, far in his views from radical social theories, 
was aware of this. He pointed to the significant potential of the economic 
model based on the free market in the elimination of authoritarian regimes, 
putting forward a thesis of the existence of an objective conflict between 
democracy and free market capitalism, preventing the implementation of full 
political equality. He stressed that when society and politics are transformed 
by free market capitalism, the situation changes fundamentally: “material 
inequality such as capitalism lead to serious political inequalities between 
citizens.”22 
The universality and strength of the ideas underlying the Polish revolution 
of the 1980s was based on, and perhaps above all, the deeper meaning of the 
idea of freedom, reminiscent of the ancient standard, in which conscious and 
active participation in deciding matters of the community lay at its core. This 
was a way of thinking and acting which went beyond the empirical standards 
existing here and now, promising to build a new system using solutions that 
were not available in the political regimes of the East and West. The failure 
of the Polish experiment in this regard can attest to the fact that it was a uto‑
pian project. However, it seems that it is precisely this element which drew 
the interest, and often, the fascination with what happened in Poland after the 
strikes and the agreements of August 1980. Many things indicated that both 
for the participants of these events, as well as for external monitors, Poland 
during this period was becoming the most democratic place in the world.23 
As noted by David Ost, a graphic observer of the Polish revolution and, later, 
its interpreter, “Solidarity introduced something new, a new way of thinking 
about power and politics. To change the system, without paying much atten‑
21 A. Tou ra i ne: Solidarność. Analiza…, p. 23.
22 R. Dah l: O demokracji. Kraków 2000, p. 165.
23 Cf. L. Goodw y n: Jak to zrobiliście? Powstanie Solidarności w Polsce. Gdańsk 1992, 
p. 587. 
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tion to it, that is to change the state, not paying attention to it. To change the 
system by organizing societies and oneself, not by overthrowing the govern‑
ment and taking power into one’s own hands. […] Solidarity charmed the 
West with its thinking about politics.”24
The actors
Solidarity, launched as a response to a small -scale conflict initiated by the 
workers of a plant, turned into a mass social movement. In 1980—1981 the 
movement gathered the vast majority of Poles interested in what was going 
on in the political sphere. Large coverage, both in terms of people and ter‑
ritory, is one of the characteristics of every revolution, which, even if it is 
initiated and coordinated by easily identifiable individuals, goes well beyond 
the narrow dimensions of such events as political upheaval or coup. From 
the very beginning, “the so -called workers’ protests — as Jacek Kurczewski 
writes — were hardly ever the endeavours of workers only, but covered the 
different groups within the workforce, their parts, to be precise, regardless of 
the class and employment hierarchy they belonged to.”25 
A thesis presented in one of the first and very popular descriptions of the 
Solidarity movement provided by Timothy Garton Ash The Polish Revolu‑
tion: Solidarity 1980—198226 that the course of events before and immedi‑
ately after August 1980 and the platform of the nascent social movement was 
mainly influenced by opposition intellectuals, and the centre of the “chain of 
command” was located in Jacek Kuroń’s apartment in Warsaw, is not how‑
ever supported by facts. For instance, the demand that registration of new 
independent trade unions, which destroyed the monocentric formula of the 
system, was implemented as a result of grassroots pressure, despite the mod‑
erate reformist demands predominant among the majority of advisors. For 
them the concept of taking over the official structures of trade unions gath‑
ered in the Central Council of Trade Unions after the adoption of the new 
law on trade union movements, was for them more realistic. “Fortunately, the 
24 D. Ost : “„Solidarność” — rewolucja, powstanie czy reforma. Dyskusja panelowa.” In: 
Solidarność od wewnątrz 1980—1981…, p. 349. See also: Idem: Solidarity and the Politics 
of Anti ‑Politics. Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968. Philadelphia 1990; Idem: 
Klęska „Solidarności”. Gniew i polityka w postkomunistycznej Europie. Warszawa 2007.
25 J. Ku rczewsk i: “Klasy średnie po latach.” In: Idem: Ścieżki emancypacji. Osobista 
teoria transformacji ustrojowej w Polsce. Warszawa 2009, pp. 217—218.
26 T.G. Ash: The Polish Revolution…
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workers had more faith in utopia than sober realism. Contrary to the intel‑
lectuals, they decided to demand the impossible.”27
The disproportion between the revolutionary desire of labour unions and 
the conservative realism of the representatives of the intelligentsia was similar 
in that in both there was a component of a concealed, albeit visible, restrained 
attitude towards too far reaching manifestations of grassroots activity and 
a conviction about the leading role of a competent vanguard. In the first phase, 
when the protest potential spontaneously grew, the structures of the movement 
began self -organising, the priority was to fight for real empowerment, particu‑
larly to grant grassroots union organisations and self -governments in compa‑
nies the right to cast the decisive vote. Along with the institutionalisation of 
NSZZ Solidarność, however, increasingly important decisions were being made 
at the central level, most of which were the result of consultations between 
leaders with experts and advisors, and were less and less frequently the result 
of the grassroots activity of the masses striving to achieve change. This was 
only partly justified by the circumstances related to the extensive scale of the 
movement. Equally important was the conviction firmly rooted in the minds 
of the elite opposition that they should decide on the direction and methods of 
operation by framing the chaotic manifestations of activity of the masses into 
a rational framework.28 I think that it is this metamorphosis that we should bear 
in mind, when in retrospect we try to answer the question of what happened to 
the activity of Polish society after 1989, when freedom finally became a reality, 
and why the political and economic policies of the new system so far deviate 
from the expectations and hopes prevailing in 1980—1981.
The Solidarity we know from before the introduction of martial law, 
which caused its complete organisational disintegration, never regained its 
original splendour. However, it still remained present as an idea and gave the 
representatives acting on its behalf symbolic legitimacy during the Round 
Table negotiations and some time later, that is in the first phase of the defi‑
nite dismantling of the political system of “real socialism.” These activities, 
due to their elitism, stood far from the basic characteristics of the struggle 
for change of the first stage of the movement’s activity. The formula of par‑
ticipatory democracy was abandoned and the activities led to a restriction 
of the principle of transparency and openness of activity and decisions. An 
attempt to explain this diversion can of course be made by citing the condi‑
tions formed as a result of the political situation, it is difficult to explain, 
however, why the retreat from the original ideals, which formed the founding 
potential of the revolution, became permanent and definitive.
27 Cf. J. Sowa: “Upadek Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej. Demokratyzacja państwa 
leninowskiego.” In: Idem: Ciesz się, późny wnuku! Kolonializm, globalizacja i demokracja 
radykalna. Kraków 2008, pp. 402—407. 
28 Cf. L. Goodw y n: Jak to zrobiliście?… 
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The form
The political change in Poland caused by a protest in 1980 differed sub‑
stantially in form from the classic modern revolution, mainly due to the fact 
that it did not require any immediate bloody confrontation between the sup‑
porters of change and the defenders of the old political order. By treating the 
course of events of 1980—1989 as a process, it is possible, as shown by Jan 
Skórzyński, to clearly define two of its phases, in which the relations between 
the form and substance were not in synch. In his opinion, “this was a two- 
faceted revolution: the first one culminating in the introduction of martial 
law and the other in the fall of communism […] — in the years 1980—1981 
this was a revolutionary process without revolutionary consequences, while 
in the years 1988—1989 there were revolutionary consequences without the 
revolutionary staffage.”29 The reluctance to use the term revolution in respect 
to this period, much more visible in the internal Polish debates than in exter‑
nal comments and evaluations results, among others, from the specific nega‑
tive connotations of the term and associating it with slogans taken from the 
dictionary of communist propaganda. The practical and statutory rejection of 
violence, utilisation of a mechanism of agreements and negotiations as the 
main means to achieving change, and the willingness to reach compromises, 
produced real effects. What is more, the consequences of this strategy went 
far beyond the originally planned objectives — the system collapsed, and the 
opposition could directly reach for power. 
Like previously in Spain and Portugal, also in Poland, it turned out that it 
is possible to achieve something that in classical revolutions could not happen, 
that is a real qualitative change in the foundations of the system without an 
aggressive physical confrontation between opposing parties and bloodshed. 
The possibility of such a course of events to take place to a certain extent was 
announced in the philosophical considerations about revolutions by Hannah 
Arendt, who clearly stressed that whether we are dealing with a revolution 
or not, does not depend on the scale of violence. According to her, “violence 
is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; 
only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is 
used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about 
the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression 
aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.”30 The 
thesis of the primacy of substance over form in an assessment of the revo‑
29 J. Skórz y ńsk i: “„Solidarność” — rewolucja, powstanie czy reforma. Dyskusja pane-
lowa.” In: Solidarność od wewnątrz…, p. 351.
30 H. A rendt: On Revolution…, p. 35.
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lutionism of mass social upheavals was upheld by S. Huntington, who noted 
that recognition of the existence of a desire for a deep change is the only way 
to effectively differentiate a revolution from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, 
coups or wars for independence.31
The term “Polish peaceful revolution” has also been used by Rett R. Lud‑
wikowski, who was fully aware of the difference between the events that took 
place in Poland and those of the revolutionary processes of the past, both in 
terms of their multistage nature and longevity (from August 1980 until the 
Round Table negotiations and changes of 1989), as well as the absence of 
abruptness, dynamism and violence -fuelled radicalism.32
The choice for holding sit -down strikes as the primary method of protest 
rather than organising marches and street demonstrations utilised in former 
uprisings, limited the risk of a recurrence of a bloody confrontation with 
the enforcement apparatus. In the monocentric state, suppressing a single 
local strike in which the formulated demands were too far reaching, did not 
seem to be a daunting task. However, for the first time on such a massive 
scale, the protest was backed by the workers of other establishments from 
various sectors and gradually engulfed the city, region, and the whole coun‑
try. The spontaneous network of contacts and horizontal agreements which 
had come to be, became the basis for the functioning of a new movement 
and paved the way for its organization and operation for many months after 
the signing of the August Agreements. This model of collective action cre‑
ated a space for the use of various forms of direct democracy, not found in 
conventional organisations and highly hierarchised traditional social move‑
ments. Leaders had the full mandate of those whom they represented, and 
many decisions were prepared jointly, through collective discussion and 
analysis of the situation, endeavours which could be described as a delib‑
erative democracy. 
The form of action — the idea of nonviolence, ultra democracy in the 
functioning of the group, full transparency of the decision -making process 
— corresponded with the aspirations. The primary factor which integrated 
these two planes was the idea of actual empowerment, the abolition of the 
distinction between “they” and “we” through socialization of all spheres of 
the functioning of the state, that is politics, economy, media and culture. As 
aptly stated by Bronisław Geremek, an anti -totalitarian revolution is char‑
acterised by the fact that unlike other revolutions “it does not intend to take 
over power, but is an assertion of the personal rights of the citizen and of 
31 S. Hu nt i ng ton: Political Order in Changing Societies. New Heaven 1968. 
Cf. Ch. Ti l ly: “Rewolucja i rebelia.” In: Władza i społeczeństwo. Ed. J. Szcz upacz y ńsk i. 
Warszawa 1995, p. 236.
32 R.R. Ludwi kowsk i: “A New Constitutional Model for East -Central Europe.” In: 
Freedom and Choice…, pp. 121—127.
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democracy. Acting in the name of freedom and human rights, it rejects the 
use of violence. It is based on a mass movement of citizens and causes an 
extreme system change, while avoiding extreme measures.”33
The new order was going to be completely different from the existing 
one. The point of reference was not only authoritarian “real socialism,” but 
also, among others, through reference to the humanistic and self -government 
elements present in the socialist movement, the critically evaluated reality of 
liberal capitalism.
Results
No revolution has ever reached its aims in full, some have even failed.34 
Demonstrating that the reality after 1989, that is the rules and mechanisms 
for the functioning of the political system, are qualitatively different from 
the reality of “real socialism,” is not difficult. Almost everything changed, 
though the main transformations are visible in the realm of freedom. These 
facts, despite the years that have passed, are still often questioned in political 
discussions, journalistic commentaries, and in some reflections on political 
philosophy. These debates are an effect of the confrontation of these facts on 
an ideological plane. The Third Republic of Poland, despite its many flaws 
and imperfections, is certainly not a repetition of PRL. The following ques‑
tion, however, still remain unanswered: If and how does the changed post-
 -authoritarian reality go together with the “idea of novelty,” an element con‑
sidered as an important gauge for the recognition or non -recognition of the 
social and political change as a revolution.
Surely there is no universal answer to this dilemma — every evaluation 
is usually based on a reference to a specific, axiologically shaded paradigm. 
I think however, that like Boris Buden, the measure of revolutionary radical‑
ism is “not so much the way changes are carried out or the violence of the 
process, as it is qualitative coverage, which includes the different forms of 
33 B. Geremek: “Solidarność jako model wyjścia z komunizmu.” In: Od Solidarności 
do wolności. 25 lat. Konferencja międzynarodowa. Ed. N. Smola r. Warszawa—Gdańsk 
2005, p. 18.
34 I agree with the view of Michael Kimmel, that after fulfilment of the basic conditions, 
that is a real pursuit for a fundamental structural change and a large scale (in coverage and 
scope) of events, can we talk about a revolution, regardless of whether the objectives of the 
protest were actually achieved. He defines revolutions as “attempts by subordinate groups to 
transform the social foundations of political power.” M.S. K im mel: Revolution. A Socio‑
logical Interpretation. Cambridge 1990, p. 6.
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democracy, both which have never existed, needing to be discovered, and 
long forgotten ones, its historically ‘immature’ forms or those that were sup‑
pressed as a result of repression.”35
Can reconstructing and duplicating existing solutions, which are treated 
as a standard, be considered revolutionary? Poland’s revolution, regardless 
of its original slogans and activity in the first phase of the overthrow of the 
authoritarian regime, however, went down the trail of replicating the Western 
model of capitalism, abandoning the seeds of the new concepts which were 
visible at the beginning of the country’s dash for liberty.
The “new” capitalistic order which was built after “communism,” instead 
of the expected empowerment, brought about another form of reification. The 
unquestioned increase in the scope of freedom understood individualistically 
was not accompanied by a sense of participation in community life, that is 
by awareness of co -deciding about its fate, neither on a local, nor a macro 
scale. This was not the first time modern capitalism demonstrated the ability 
to absorb novelties without revising its foundations. Analogous adaptability 
capabilities of this system came to life when faced with the radical counter- 
cultural youth demands of the end of the 1960s. A widening of the scope of 
negative freedom and an increase in consumption took place, and the com‑
munity revolt based on the ideas of the beat -generation was replaced with the 
narcissistic philosophy of life of the me -generation, that is hippies became 
yuppies.
The Polish experiment of 1980—1989 is a case of revolutionism which 
was not fully realised. A change involving the dismantling of the old 
system resulted in the creation of an anti -hegemonic order, far deviating 
from the intentions, objectives and expectations of the participants of the 
anti -authoritarian movement. New forms of political alienation and inten‑
sifying stratification in the economic sphere appeared. The deepening of 
the differences in the level of life is systematically rationalised through the 
development of formal and legal mechanisms as well as social and cultural 
patterns which are adequate to the current state of affairs. Various measures 
are used to achieve this, including the skilful gradual monopolization and 
concentration of information within the framework of the so ‑called media 
convergence process, as well as the achievements of social sciences, whose 
representatives have departed from research and reflection on the empow‑
erment of society, which was inspired by the ideals of the revolution. The 
negative attitude of intellectual and political elites to bottom -up processes 
of the self -organization of society was visible in sociology and political 
sciences. A picture of the paternalistic elites’ uphill struggle to introduce 
a rational project of change began to emerge, where all their efforts were 
35 B. Buden: Strefa przejścia. O końcu postkomunizmu. Warszawa 2012, p. 29.
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met with resistance of a society contaminated with the syndrome of homo 
sovieticus.36
Of the three perspectives and possibilities for the future: a) a return to the 
past, involving the revival of the different national and cultural communities, 
which are separated from each other by traditional border, b) continuation 
of the current path, with an emphasis on its enhancement and correction, 
c) qualitative changes, in the form of a post -liberal democracy project — only 
the third option provides the opportunity to start the process of constructing 
a social model based on real social rationality. The economic crisis of 2008 is 
not a mere coincidence or the result of human error in choosing strategy, but 
the effect of the structural properties of the system. 
Of course, in criticizing the specificity of the effects of the process of 
democratization of Polish society (and other societies emerging from authori‑
tarian governance) one should bear in mind the context, which defines the 
objectively specific historical and cultural characteristics, which are often — 
here and now — the foundation of continuity and social cohesion. Incentives 
to ignore it can appear in ideas put forward by the internal elite or result 
from the pressure of society. Violent actions, “mechanical attempts to intro‑
duce classical structures of ‘modern’ organisations of western societies, in 
particular too radical attempts in this direction can lead to the misbalancing 
of social order and to many resultant dangerous and sometimes downright 
tragic processes.”37
It seems that effective reconciliation of traditions with the determinants of 
the present and future challenges through plain copying of existing standards 
is impossible. Many things indicate that this is exactly the way we are headed 
in building a democratic state in Poland. In economic terms, by looking at 
bare statistical data, we are pursuing this objective with success. However, 
not much is left from the revolutionary and innovative potential of 1980—
1981. By mechanically replicating free market individualistic liberalism (for‑
tunately, not in its 19th -century variety, as some representatives of the Polish 
extreme right propose) we have resigned from most of the ideas and concepts 
which were alive at the time of the revolutionary uprising, which contributed 
to building, above party lines, an authentic community. Its place was taken 
by alienation and anomy, which was not only a consequence of the adopt‑
ed economic model, but the result of the domination of extreme elitism in 
the political sphere. From the formal side — everything is fine, our political 
system meets all the criteria and standards of modern empirical democracy, 
and generally achieves relatively high scores in the various indexes of the 
36 Cf. A. Kolasa  ‑Nowak: Zmiana systemowa w Polsce w interpretacjach socjologicz‑
nych. Lublin 2010, pp. 148—149.
37 T. Za r yck i: “Socjologia krytyczna na peryferiach.” Kultura i Społeczeństwo 2009, 
No. 1, p. 119.
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level of democratisation. In practice, however, democracy has become and 
remains such only at face value, behind which there is growing passivity and 
apathy of the majority, an escape from reflection on public affairs, declining 
voter turnout, open contestation parties and the political elite.
The question of a semantic nature posed in the title has been repeatedly 
raised in scientific papers, in the press and political polemics. It is essential, 
though not fundamental. A lot seems to indicate that the existing terminolog‑
ical confusion caused by the new and different characteristics of the system 
change that occurred at the turn of the 20th century, as well as by the ideo‑
logical controversies that surrounded them, which are of particular relevance 
to the Polish debate on the subject, are of lesser importance than the ques‑
tion of the point of the transformations. Perhaps the simplest solution to the 
issue of definition is to include the term “revolutionary transformation” into 
the catalogue of terms of sociological and political science analysis, which 
Claus Offe used freely, without any additional comment in his work on the 
democratization of Central European countries, thus negating the seeming 
contradiction between these two terms.38 However, the issue of the assess‑
ment of the sense and content of revolutionary political change remains open. 
The new “velvet” revolutions, are significantly different from their classic, 
modern era prototypes — they feature a characteristic ideological vagueness, 
multidimensionality and a different rhythm of political, social and cultural 
processes.39 For now, the former class -based system of identification of the 
revolution has been replaced by a criterion built on the basis of the totalitari‑
anism (authoritarianism) — democracy opposition, qualifying as a revolution 
every transformation of the political regime expanding the realm of political 
freedom with the basic attributes of modern empirical democracy, such as: 
pluralism, free universal elections, free flow of information, etc. 
And yet a lot indicates that this is not the end of the history which had 
started in 1980. The theories of transition, which became particularly popular 
in western literature, describing the changes in Central and Eastern Europe as 
a more or less inevitable process of transforming undemocratic state socialism 
into democratic liberal capitalism, cannot be treated otherwise than a mod‑
ernised version of ideological American developmentalism of the 1960s, in 
light of which objectively backward peripheral societies are doomed to rep‑
licate universal political, economic and cultural mechanisms elaborated by 
the mature democracies of the West. As noted aptly by B. Buden, “claiming 
that the actual objective and highest ideal of Polish workers was the liberal 
democratic capitalism which existed in the West, it would be just as mislead‑
38 C. Of fe: Drogi transformacji. Doświadczenia wschodnioeuropejskie i wschodnionie‑
mieckie. Warszawa—Kraków 1999, p. 42.
39 J. St an isz k is: Samoograniczająca się rewolucja. Gdańsk 2010, pp. 25—26.
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ing as stating that they rose because of an increase in the price of meat […]. 
Just like the gauge in reality, which they opened with their democratic — and 
revolutionary! — movement could not be sealed shut by a decrease of meat 
prices, neither can it be said that the reality of a liberal -democratic society in 
which they live, is the final realization of their democratic dreams.”40
An analysis of the contradictions inherent to the mechanisms and con‑
sequences of the Polish breakthrough of 1980—1989, regardless of the vari‑
ous controversies and polemics accompanying their assessment, attests to 
the qualitative nature of the changes which this historic experiment resulted 
in. The experience of the last decades, the effect of which is a tendency to 
replace authoritarian regimes with different forms of political democracy, 
very often by way of transformations, which are different to those character‑
istic for conventional revolutions, lead to the recognition of not the form, but 
the substance as a basic measure of the revolutionary nature of the changes 
in the political systems of today. It is necessary to update the traditional, 
orthodox understanding of revolution and define it by taking into account 
the new socio ‑cultural context.41 The case of Poland was, and remains, espe‑
cially because of its international consequences, one of the most important 
events of this kind in the 20th century. At the same time, a clearly discern‑
ible gap between the objectives of the Polish revolution (creation of an anti- 
authoritarian democratic system based on the principles of social justice) and 
the final result (reproduction of the capitalist individualistic liberal democ‑
racy model) must lead to the conclusion that it did not fully live up to the 
aspirations and expectations of its participants. 
The increasingly discernible crisis of the liberal democracy model and 
the escalating new sharp lines of division in the 21st century, both within 
societies, and on a global scale, must lead to the question if the blocked, 
abandoned and lost ideological and empirical potential of the Polish revolu‑
tion is still not a significant point of reference to which, sooner or later, we 
will return.
40 B. Buden: Strefa przejścia…, p. 29.
41 Cf. Z. Bau man: Intimations of Postmodernity. London 1992, p. 179.
